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example includes a grassroots logistics
effort that supported a national army
by coordinating donations of money
and supplies from across the globe.
It proved so effective that Ukrainian
military commanders sent in supply
orders; in true e-commerce fashion,
civilians fulfilled the requests and even
delivered items—including uniforms
and flak jackets—to units in the field.
Contrast this effort to the U.S. Liberty
Bond and war bond drives of the two
world wars as an indirect mechanism for
noncombatant support. The Ukrainian
Facebook-driven campaign, although
conducted outside sanctioned government control, had more impact on the
individual donor, because the donors
could see the direct effects of their
efforts. The nature of much civilian
support for a belligerent on one side of
a conflict has not changed—consider
care packages and letters in the mail
in wars past. Yet the characteristics
have transformed through individual
empowerment, displaying a magnitude
and immediacy unseen in military
history. It exemplifies a transfer of
real impact on combat effectiveness
from traditional institutions and
hierarchies to networks of individuals.
For centuries the United States enjoyed
a geopolitical position that protected
our shores from direct interventions.
Arguably, cyberspace, with its instant
accessibility from afar, could counterbalance that advantage. As we begin to
understand cyberborne capabilities
enabling conflicts, works such as War
in 140 Characters should shape the way
we think about our vulnerabilities. The
book constitutes an author’s plea to understand better twenty-first-century war,
and it leaves the reader compelled to
ponder the strategic implications of the
way ahead. Do information revolutions
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of the past, such as the advents of the
printing press, radio, and television,
illuminate a path forward for society to
follow? It is clear from Patrikarakos’s
work that increasingly effective individuals promulgating disparate realities on
social media will mandate entirely new
approaches from traditional Western
institutions if they are going to survive.
MARC D. BEAUDREAU

Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics, by Austin Carson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 2018. 344 pages. $35.

Professor Carson takes up two intriguing
and related questions: Why do nations
often choose to intervene covertly
rather than overtly in military conflicts,
and why do their adversaries, after
detecting the intervention, often choose
to stay silent about it (or, as he calls it,
“collude”)? Using four case studies (the
Spanish Civil War, the Korean War,
the Vietnam War, and the Soviet war
in Afghanistan), he develops his own
theory of why nations act these ways.
His theory applies to “limited wars”—
conflicts in which some of the adversaries (the outside great-power intervenors)
are not employing the full range of their
capabilities. Carson argues that maintaining a war’s limited character provides
the motivation for this collusion of covertness. Demonstrating how this works
is the core of his argument, and the case
studies provide persuasive examples.
First, by intervening covertly—or by
not publicizing an adversary’s covert
intervention—a party avoids stirring
up hawkish public opinion, both
domestically and on the part of the
adversary. By avoiding public demands
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to “win the war” by whatever means
necessary and risk a face-losing,
disadvantageous settlement, both
leaderships preserve maneuver room.
Second, by thus reducing the political
consequences, both parties can signal
their desire to keep the conflict limited.
In essence, both sides bargain—while
pursuing their respective interests—and
cooperate in escalation avoidance.
Since this point is the book’s key
contribution to the literature on this
subject, let us see how it works.
An intervenor proceeding covertly
instead of overtly pays a price: he may
be constrained in the size of the force he
sends and the weaponry employed, his
logistics may be more complicated and
less efficient, and he forgoes whatever
reputational advantage he might gain
by being seen as having supported his
allies and stood up for his principles.
By paying this price, the intervenor
signals to his adversary that his desire
to win is constrained by his interest in
keeping the conflict limited; he shows
respect for the adversary’s reputation
by not confronting him openly.
When the adversary detects the
intervention yet does not use his
knowledge to diplomatic or propaganda advantage, he likewise signals
his interest in avoiding escalation. He
shows that he is avoiding a self-imposed
requirement to confront the intervenor
openly and defeat his intervention.
While Carson argues for the importance
of this dynamic, he fully recognizes
that many other reasons for covertness
and collusion exist beyond the two he
discusses: “[I]t bears repeating that my
limited-war theory does not claim to
be a ‘master cause’ of all secrecy in war.
Alternative logics are compatible with
my own logic even within the same
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conflict” (p. 63). Thus, a government
may intervene covertly if it hopes
to hide its involvement from dovish
domestic opinion, or if it seeks to
gain an operational advantage from
secrecy. Indeed, it is possible that
keeping an (initial) intervention covert
is a means of putting one’s adversary
off his guard and thus achieving
surprise when one subsequently
intervenes in a more substantial way.
However, there are additional reasons
for covertness/collusion that the
book ignores or underemphasizes.
If a government wants, for whatever
reason, to follow a moderate course in
a conflict, it has more than hawkish
domestic opinion to worry about; it
also must make sure that its adversaries
or third parties do not interpret its
moderation as weakness. Hence, it may
employ covertness as a way of reducing
the reputational stakes involved.
The same logic operates for the detector.
While Carson notes that the detector
might gain diplomatic advantages from
going public, he underemphasizes the
other side of the coin: complaining about
an adversary’s intervention in a conflict
and underreacting merely may advertise
one’s weakness. A government also may
collude if it fears that public knowledge
of the adversary’s military action will
fan fears of a wider conflict, scaring its
own (dovish) public or third parties,
and thereby increasing opposition to
its own involvement in the conflict.
Additionally, a government may keep its
intervention covert—or at least unacknowledged—for propaganda reasons;
open intervention might contradict its
own self-portrayal in its propaganda
as pacific and anti-interventionist.
The book is at its strongest in showing
how covertness and collusion can serve
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the purpose of avoiding escalation. But
ultimately, no government intervenes
for the sake of keeping a conflict limited;
regardless of that goal, its actions will
be determined most by the political
objective it seeks to achieve. The author’s
theory sheds light on one aspect of the
actors’ motives in cases in which the
desire to avoid escalation is relatively
strong. But, as in the case of any such
theory, understanding such situations
requires a full assessment of the goals
and circumstances of each of the actors.
ABRAM N. SHULSKY

China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed. Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 352
pages. $50.

In its long history, China has deployed
substantial naval power, but only
episodically. It never faced sustained
naval threats, so the country’s maritime
frontier was not a perennial strategic
concern. But in more modern times,
seaborne pressures from the Western
powers and Japan became unremitting.
Foreign navies even sailed deep into the
country’s interior, establishing “treaty
ports” hundreds of miles from the coast.
This ended with the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. Still,
even though Western naval power was
pushed offshore, seaborne forces nearby
could attack China with impunity.
This rankled, but what to do? In 1965,
Marshal Lin Biao (perhaps Chairman
Mao’s closest comrade in arms) looked
to the earlier defeat of Japan by the
once-tiny People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) to ask, “How was it possible for a
weak country finally to defeat a strong
country?” His answer was found in
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Mao Zedong’s idea of “People’s War.”
Although land based, the concept held
promise for menacing forward naval
positions of the United States, perceived
as the foremost opponent. Having
backed an insurgency in the Philippines,
a coup attempt in Indonesia, and guerilla
wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Beijing
could imagine pushing the United
States out of great anchorages such as
Subic, Cam Rahn, and Singapore. As
for Yokosuka, Japan—the U.S. Navy’s
most important base in the western
Pacific—a successful political campaign
might chase the United States four
thousand miles east, back to Honolulu.
This was naval warfare de facto, but
it did not succeed. In the end, China
learned that American sea power
could not be neutralized on the cheap.
However, China began to rise
economically through its seaborne
connections, and in the 1980s Admiral
Liu Huaqing—sometimes called “China’s
Mahan”—made a case for a strong navy.
This vision was realized more fully in
2012 when Communist Party leader Hu
Jintao announced a new national goal:
“to enhance our capacity for exploiting
marine resources, develop the marine
economy, protect the marine maritime
rights and interests, and build China
into a strong maritime power.”
During this same period of an economically rising China, the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute
became a leading center for analyzing
China’s naval power. Two of the Institute’s mainstays, Andrew Erickson and
Ryan Martinson, again have contributed
to our understanding by assembling and
editing twenty papers prepared for a
2017 conference on what could turn out
to be the most significant component
of China’s modus operandi at sea:
exploitation of the so-called gray zone.
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